Resilient Distributed Control of HVDC-FACTS Systems under Cyber-attacks and Communication Delays
Keywords:
Centralized, Cyber-attack, Delay, Distributed, DoS, FDI, HVDC-FACTS, ResilienceAbstract
The increasing integration of High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) links and Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices in modern power grids has significantly enhanced system flexibility, controllability, and operational efficiency. However, the reliance of these systems on wide-area communication networks exposes them to cyber-attacks and communication delays, posing serious threats to grid stability and reliability. This paper investigates the problem of resilient distributed control of HVDC-FACTS systems under cyber-attacks and communication impairments. The research focuses on the modeling and analysis of False Data Injection (FDI) and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks targeting measurement and control communication channels, alongside variable and uncertain communication delays. A delay-tolerant and attack-resilient control framework is developed using distributed and decentralized control architectures to mitigate the impact of these adversarial conditions. The proposed control strategies incorporate attack detection and mitigation mechanisms, as well as robustness against time-varying delays, without relying on a fully centralized control structure. Results demonstrate that the proposed resilient distributed control schemes effectively maintain system stability, power flow regulation, and damping performance under coordinated cyber-attacks and communication delays. Compared to conventional centralized controllers, the distributed approach is anticipated to offer improved scalability, reduced vulnerability to single-point failures, and enhanced resilience against DoS attacks. Simulation studies on benchmark multi-terminal HVDC and FACTS-integrated power systems are expected to confirm that the proposed methods significantly reduce performance degradation, limit the propagation of corrupted data, and ensure acceptable dynamic responses even under severe attack scenarios. Overall, this research contributes to the development of secure and resilient control solutions for cyber-physical power systems, providing practical insights into the trade-offs between centralized and decentralized control architectures and advancing the cybersecurity of future HVDC–FACTS-enabled smart grids.
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